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seminars at the University of Oslo for help and valuable comments.First, the American public thinks that most people who receive welfare are black,
and second, the public thinks that blacks are less committed to the work ethic than
other Americans. There exists now a widespread perception that welfare has become
a ”code word” for race (Gilens 1999: 3).
1 Introduction
The above quote from Martin Gilens’s (1999) book Why Americans Hate Welfare is represen-
tative for a widespread view: It’s impossible to understand the American welfare state without
considering race, and if not racism, at least racial stereotypes. In this paper I will explore how
this may enhance economists’ understanding of the relationship between inequality, fractional-
ization, and redistribution. This is important not only to understand the American welfare state,
but also to understand politics in other heavily fractionalized societies, such as most African
countries.
The conventional political economy approach to analysing preferences for redistribution is
through the median voter model. The main result is more redistribution in societies with high
inequality than in societies with less, as the median voter’s preferences for redistribution are
inversely related to the diﬀerence between her income and the average income (Romer 1975,
Roberts 1977, Meltzer and Richard 1981). The empirical support for the hypothesis is mixed.
B´ enabou (1996) survey a number of older studies that mostly reject it. Milanovic (2000) claims
this is mainly due to data problems. Using an improved data set, he ﬁnds support for the
theory. The most striking argument against the theory is probably the diﬀerence between most
European countries and the US, and to an even larger extent most Latin American countries.1
A separate literature has recently emerged studying the eﬀects of fractionalization along
ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other lines on public policy and economic performance. There
is now a substantial theoretical literature explaining why particularly public good provision
is lower in fractionalized communities,2 and the empirical support for the detrimental eﬀects
of fractionalization on public policy is quite strong.3 However, this literature generally studies
agents that are equal except for their group belonging, so we can’t study the relationship between
income distribution and public policy in fractionalized societies.
The main novelty of my approach is the joint modelling of group and income heterogeneity.
I can then study how each of these inﬂuence support for redistribution as well as how the
joint impact is. It turns out that inequality may have very diﬀerent eﬀects on support for
redistribution in fractionalized and non-fractionalized societies.
1Recent research has attempted to explain this puzzle. B´ enabou’s (2000) model is probably the best known.
He presents a model where redistribution both has beneﬁcial eﬀects due to credit market imperfections and
distorts the labour supply decision. Under reasonable assumptions, there may be political support for two ”social
contracts”, one with an even distribution of income and support for redistribution to reduce the eﬀects of missing
credit markets, and one with high inequality and little support for redistribution. Competing explanations have
been proposed by e.g. Saint-Paul (2001), Roemer (1998, 1999), Moene and Wallerstein (2001), Bjorvatn and
Cappelen (2002), and Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001).
2Based on such factors as diﬀerentiated tastes (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999), antagonism to mixing
with members of other groups (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000), and the fact that social sanctions are more eﬃcient
within groups than between groups (Miguel and Gugerty 2003). There is also some earlier theoretical contributions
mainly based on social conﬂict and lack of social capital (inter alia Benhabib and Rusticini 1996, Knack and Keefer
1997, Keefer and Knack 2002, Rodrik 1999), but they are less relevant for this paper.
3Alesina and his co-workers have documented that fractionalization tends to reduce the supply of public goods,
redistribution, and participation in US communities (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999, Alesina, Glaeser, and
Sacerdote 2001, Alesina and La Ferrara 2001). This is corroborated by similar ﬁndings in Pakistan (Khwaja 2002)
and Kenya (Miguel and Gugerty 2003). Furthermore, comparing Kenya, where ethic conﬂicts are important, to
Tanzania, where there is less ethnic conﬂict, Miguel (2003) ﬁnds that ethnic fractionalization is important in
Kenya but insigniﬁcant in Tanzania.
2I present a model in the tradition of Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard where a tax used for
redistributive transfers is determined by popular vote. Unlike the traditional model, I allow
voters to have a social conscience in that they care about social welfare in addition to their
private well-being. In itself, this extension does not change the main conclusions of the model.
But in fractionalized societies, it is natural to assume that agents care mostly about the welfare
of those belonging to their own group, that is, agents have a group or race bias in their social
conscience. I label this group antagonism. Then two persons with the same endowment, but
one belonging to a rich and one to a poor group, have diﬀerent preferences for taxation. The
poorer the group one belongs to, the higher is the preferred tax rate. This means that voters
with the median preferred tax rate will have diﬀerent endowments depending on which group
they belong to. Consequently, we can no longer talk about the median voter as a single agent.
Instead, there is a set of median voters, one from each group.
The model gives two key insights. First, both fractionalization and group antagonism reduces
the support for redistribution, even if the poor group is in majority. This is because higher group
antagonism, in the sense that people care more about their own group and less about the others,
tends to reduce the preferred tax rate for voters who belong to a rich group. An increase in the
degree of fractionalization therefore leads to a new set of median voters. Median voters who
belong to a rich group now prefer lower tax rates and are replaced by poorer agents. Median
voters who belong to a poor group are replaced by richer agents. Under general conditions, the
result of this process is a political economic equilibrium where the chosen tax rate is lower. This
is because the initial median voter from the poor group was in a higher income fractile within
her group than the voter from the rich group. When the income distribution for each group is
skewed to the right, this implies that the increase in the income of the median voters from the
poor groups is larger than the decline in the income of the voters from the rich groups. Thus
the tax rate preferred by the new set of median voters must be lower. When fractionalization is
high, this eﬀect is stronger.
Second, the model also predicts that increased inequality between groups will reduce the
support for redistribution. The reasoning is quite similar to the one above; when the rich group
becomes richer, their preferences for redistribution decline. Hence the new median voter from
the rich group is poorer and vice versa for the poor group. Again, the decline in the income
of the median voter from the rich group is smaller than the rise in the income of the median
voter from the poor group. Then the new political equilibrium is a lower tax rate and less
redistribution. This result is also independent of which group is in majority.
To test the validity of the key insights of the model, I use a panel of US states observed in
six years between 1969 and 2000. As data on inequality by race are not available in preexisting
sources, I constructed these data using micro data from the Luxembourg Income Study. Un-
like most earlier studies, this permits focusing on pre-tax income which should be the relevant
variable for determining tax preferences. The empirical support for the model is good: Frac-
tionalization and between group inequality tends to reduce redistribution whereas with group
inequality increases it. Although the eﬀect of between group inequality is usually not signiﬁ-
cantly smaller than zero, it is signiﬁcantly smaller than the eﬀect of within group inequality.
These conclusions are also robust to the inclusion of state ﬁxed eﬀects and robust regression
techniques.
Although a large fraction of public expenditure is on social insurance, I only consider pure
redistributive schemes. Notice though that my model may be interpreted so that transfers form
an insurance scheme. Public goods may also be treated as a particular redistributive scheme.
A related work is Austen-Smith and Wallerstein (2003), who present a model of joint deter-
mination of redistribution and scope of aﬃrmative action. They show that in divided societies,
support for welfare spending is lower than in non-divided societies. Vigdor (2001) alludes to
a theory where people are altruistic to members of their own group and discusses the eﬀect
3of this on provision of public goods. Collier (2000, 2001) discusses similar questions, but his
analysis of democratic regimes is somewhat brief. I will also show that his conclusions do not
necessarily hold in a more general framework. Luttmer (2001) studies the relationship between
group membership and preferences for redistribution. He ﬁnds a preference structure that is
similar to the one I use. However, he does not study the political-economic implication of these
preferences. Persson and Tabellini (1994) also use a model with similarities to my model to
study the eﬀects of centralization, but their focus is also diﬀerent. Finally there’s a large liter-
ature in sociology and political science studying the impact of racial divide on policy making
and political behaviour. The most comprehensive is probably Kinder and Sanders’ (1996) study
of a number of possible explanations of diﬀering opinions between blacks and whites. Gilens
(1999) study how racial stereotypes, mainly formed by the media, inﬂuence people’s support
for redistribution, while Wilson in a number of works (e.g. Wilson 1978, 1999) has discussed
class based versus racially based political segmentation and advocated a multiracial coalition
of the lower- and middle-class to combat poverty. However, although the topic is similar, the
theoretical approaches in these works are diﬀerent from mine.
2 The model
2.1 The baseline case
I consider an economy with a continuum of heterogeneous agents with mass normalized to one.
Each agent has an income or endowment of a taxable good whose distribution in the economy
may be described by a cumulative density function F with support Ω ⊆ R+. Denote by ¯ x and
xm the mean and median endowment. Utility derived from consumption of the good is given by
the function u which is assumed to be increasing and concave. The model is static, so there are
no credit markets. In the absence of transfers, an agent with endowment x reaches utility level
u(x), and under the assumption of a utilitarian social welfare function, social welfare equals R
Ω u(x) dF (x).
There is a government that redistributes resources before production takes place. Every agent
faces a linear tax rate t and receives a transfer T (t) ¯ x where T is a function that represents the
outcome of taxation. The function takes account of a possible deadweight loss. We could of
course model this explicitly as for instance a choice of labour supply, but this would add little
to the model and make it more cumbersome. It is natural to assume that the deadweight loss is
absent at t = 0 and increases as t increases. Hence I assume that T satisﬁes T (0) = 0, T0 (0) = 1,
T0 (t) ≤ 1, and T00 (t) ≤ 0, that is, a concave Laﬀer curve. For simplicity, I will also assume
T (1) = 0 so that the optimal tax rate is strictly below unity. The tax rate t is determined as
the outcome of a political process where the chosen tax rate corresponds to the one preferred
by the median voter.
All agents care about their own utility. However, they also have social conscience which
implies that they care about the social welfare level. For a given mean income (tax base) ¯ x,
social welfare is given by
S (t,F) =
Z
Ω
u[(1 − t)x + T (t) ¯ x]dF (x). (1)
The last argument of S is an element from the space of income distributions, i.e. social welfare
depends on the tax rate t and the society’s income distribution F. Hence for a given tax rate,
social welfare will change if we change the income distribution. Notice that S is linear in the
income distribution in the sense that for two functions F1 and F2 and two constants a1 and a2,
S (t,a1F1 + a2F2) = a1S (t,F1) + a2S (t,F2).
4Agents weight their private utility by 1 − α and social welfare by α. Then an agent with
initial endowment x maximizes
U (x,t) = (1 − α)u[(1 − t)x + T (t) ¯ x] + αS (t,F) (2)
where α is a coeﬃcient of social conscience. Throughout the paper, I assume α ∈ [0,1].4 The
assumption of social conscience may seem ad hoc. However, the decision to vote at all is hard
to justify by a purely selﬁsh oriented argument. For instance Knack (1992) and Mueller (1987)
argue that voting may be the outcome of ”social behaviour”. If the decision to vote is based
on non-egoistic reasoning, it seems rather implausible that the political preferences should be
purely egoistic. There is also overwhelming experimental evidence to support this preference
structure (Charness and Rabin 2002). Hence I believe that the assumption of social conscience
is plausible.
To simplify expression (2), consider the class of step functions
Dx (y) =

0 if y < x
1 if y ≥ x,
(3)
that is, the distribution of a degenerate random variable that equals x with probability one.
Now, it is seen that U may be rewritten
U (x,t) = (1 − α)S (t,Dx) + αS (t,F) = S (t,(1 − α)Dx + αF), (4)
where the last equality follows from the linearity of S. The second term in the S-function,
(1 − α)Dx + αF, is the subjective weighting function for the individual, i.e. the weight the
agent puts on persons from diﬀerent income groups. If α = 0, she only cares about agents with
her income; if α = 1 she uses the true distribution in society. For any such weighting function,
the agent’s preferred tax rate is found my maximizing S with regard to t. Since S is globally
concave in t for any weighting function, the maximum is given by the ﬁrst order condition5. It
follows that preferences are single-peaked, so the median voter theorem applies. Furthermore,
for α < 1, the optimal t is decreasing in x. Denote by τ the function that to any given income
distribution assigns the optimal tax rat, i.e.
τ (G) = argmax
t
S (t,G).
Since S is globally concave this is a single-valued function. Now the socially optimal tax rate is
τ (F) whereas the tax rate preferred by an agent with endowment x is τ ((1 − α)Dx + αF).
With few exceptions, I assume that income distributions are continuous, i.e. contains no
mass points, so that fractiles are well-deﬁned in all cases. The case of discontinuous distribution
functions is brieﬂy discussed in Appendix A. In the continuous case, the tax rate chosen by the
median voter satisﬁes the following system:

St (t,(1 − α)Dxm + αF) = 0
F (xm) = 1
2
. (5)
4We could also have α < 0, which implies that the agent derives utility from consumption and superiority to
the average of the economy, and also α > 1 where the agent willingly accepts martyrdom. However, these cases
are probably rather unrealistic.
5Given the characteristics of T, S is always maximized for a t < 1. If we require t ≥ 0, there may be corner
solutions for some agents. Although negative redistribution is unrealistic I will not exclude it to maintain analytic
simplicity.
52.2 Fractionalized societies
Assume now that the society is divided into a number of mutually exclusive groups where an
agent belonging to one group cares more about the welfare of her group than that of other
groups. For simplicity, assume that there are only two groups, A and B. The main results hold
for multiple groups and overlapping group dimensions, but the model gets more cumbersome.
A proportion q of the population belongs to group A and the remaining (1 − q) to group B. The
income distribution6 within the groups are described by FA and FB which are both assumed to
have support Ω. Hence F = qFA + (1 − q)FB.
The totally fractionalized case is when agents completely ignore the welfare of other groups.
Then the utility of a member of group i ∈ {A,B} with endowment x is given by
Ui (x,t) = S (t,(1 − α)Dx + αFi). (6)
As shown above, preferences are single-peaked and within one group, the desired tax rate is
decreasing in x. However, two persons with identical endowments, but belonging to diﬀerent
groups, have in general diﬀerent preferred tax rates.7 Hence it is insuﬃcient to look at the initial
endowments to ﬁnd the median voter. In fact, we will have two median voters, one from each
group. They have a common preferred tax rate, but in general their endowments diﬀer. Call
the endowment of the A median voter xm
A and that of the B median voter xm
B. Then the tax
rate t chosen by the median voters satisﬁes the system



S
 
t,(1 − α)Dxm
A + αFA

= 0
S
 
t,(1 − α)Dxm
B + αFB

= 0
qFA (xm
A) + (1 − q)FB (xm
B) = 1
2
. (7)
In general, we have FA 6= FB. Then normally the group-wise socially optimal tax rates τ (FA)
and τ (FB) diﬀer. Then two agents from diﬀerent groups with the same income x will have
diﬀerent preferred tax rates for any x. This is because the person belonging to the richest group
prefers a lower tax rate than the one belonging to the poorest group when there is some degree
of social conscience towards one’s own group. Then it follows that in the system (7), xm
A 6= xm
B,
and the endowment is lowest for the one belonging to the richest group. Notice also that xm
A
and xm
B does usually not correspond to the median endowment of the respective group, but is
determined by the system (7) and corresponds to the incomes of the agents with median tax
preference.
A less extreme and analytically more tractable case is where agents put some weight on their
group and some on the society as a whole. I will label this partial fractionalization. Here, agents
from group i with endowment x have preferences
Ui (x,t) = S (t,(1 − α)Dx + βαFi + (1 − β)αF). (8)
I will restrict attention to β ∈ [0,1]. When β = 1, we have the completely fractionalized case
whereas the non-fractionalized corresponds to β = 0.8 The politically chosen tax rate t satisﬁes



St
 
t,(1 − α)Dxm
A + βαFA + (1 − β)αF

= 0
St
 
t,(1 − α)Dxm
B + βαFB + (1 − β)αF

= 0
qFA (xm
A) + (1 − q)FB (xm
B) = 1
2
. (9)
6We may also allow agents to put diﬀerent weights on agents with diﬀerent endowments in their welfare
calculi. The analysis so far has assumed that FA and FB correspond to actual income distributions but this is
not necessary. If we keep ¯ x ﬁxed, these cumulative income distributions may also include a subjective weighting
of the diﬀerent income groups.
7This is a quite general result in models where agents diﬀer by income and other characteristics, such as
overlapping generations-models (Persson and Tabellini 2000: Section 6.2.2).
8We could also have β > 1, which is the racist agent who wants to hurt the other group, and β < 0, which
could be a ”militant anti-racist” who wants to punish her own group. Both cases are rather extreme.
6This is a system of three equations that determine the tax rate t and the income of the two pivotal
voters xm
A and xm
B. I will label the parameter β the degree of group antagonism. An increase in
β implies that agents put more emphasis on their own group and less on society as a whole. It
is important to distinguish this parameter from the Herﬁndahl index of fractionalization often
used in empirical analyses.
How should we understand this group-restricted social conscience? It may arise if we view
social conscience as a result of reciprocity (Bowles, Fong, and Gintis 2001; Bowles and Gintis
2000; Charness and Rabin 2002). One person’s caring for others is conditional on the other
caring for the ﬁrst as well. An equilibrium and focal point in this situation is that persons
belonging to one group care about all the others in that group and no others. Secondly, a
highly group-based social conscience corresponds closely to the sociological concept of group
self-interest which ﬁnds strong empirical support in studies of support for welfare spending
(Bobo and Kluegel 1993). For instance Kinder and Sanders (1996) ﬁnd virtually no support for
self-interest aﬀecting political opinions, but conclude that group self-interest plays an important
role. In the model set out above, this would mean both a high degree of social conscience α and
a high degree of group antagonism β. The fractionalization may also be interpreted as a belief
that people from one’s own group are more deserving of public transfers than others, as found by
e.g. Gilens (1999). Furthermore, the social conscience introduced above may be seen as agents
considering welfare as a local public good where β is a measure of the localness of the good.
However, unless groups are perfectly segregated geographically, “local” must be interpreted at
a more abstract level than usual. Finally, this restricted social conscience may also be seen as
an extension of Barro’s (1974) dynastic utility function where the family now also includes the
group, although possibly with a smaller weigh.
In the current model, the only objective of the government is to transfer income between
individuals. However, in a dynamic setting, there could also be demand for a social insurance
scheme. It is possible to interpret the model in this way: Assume for simplicity that voting
takes place at some time, and society keeps that decision for ever. Agents are subject to income
shocks arriving by some Poisson process, and if they are hit by a shock their income is redrawn
from their group’s income distribution. With an appropriate discount rate below unity, this will
give a utility function of the form (8). Notice that even if agents have the same degree of social
conscience for both their own group and other groups, a segmented labour market, in the sense
that new incomes are drawn from diﬀerent distributions for diﬀerent groups, is suﬃcient to make
it appear as if the agent had a group biased social conscience. Hence we could reinterpret the
whole model as an analysis of the consequences of a segregated labour market.
3 The size of government
3.1 Discrete income distributions
I will start the discussion of the impact of fractionalization on the size of government by looking
at a simpliﬁed version of the model where there are only two levels of initial incomes, high income
xh and low income xl < xh. This means that the income distributions are step functions. The
groupwise income distributions diﬀer in the proportion of rich to poor agents. Hence except
pathological cases, the median voter will belong to a single group. Oﬀhandedly, we might
believe that an agent from a poor group always prefers a higher tax rate than one from a rich
group. This will be the case if agents have a low degree of social conscience and low group
commitment. I refer to this case as a class society as political preferences are determined mainly
by income. In contrast, there are cases where the group biased social conscience is so strong
that the poor agents from the rich group vote for a lower tax rate than the rich agents from
the poor group. We may say that their altruism for the rich of their own group overrides their
7poverty on election day. I will label this a group society.
To simplify notation, I write υj (t) = u

(1 − t)xj + T (t) ¯ x

for j ∈ {l,h}. Further, let the
fraction of As having high and low income be qh
A and ql
A, whereas the same proportions for the
Bs are qh
B and ql
B. We may summarize it in the following table:
Poor Rich
As ql
A qh
A qA
Bs ql
B qh
B qB
ql qh 1
In what follows, I assume that there are a larger proportion of rich among the As than among
the Bs, that is qh
A/qA > qh
B/qB. We consider the partially fractionalized case. The four groups
have preferences over the tax rate given by (8). We may rewrite each voters’s maximand as
ψυl (t) + υh (t) where the value of ψ is
ψl
i =
(1−α)qi+αβql
i+α(1−β)qlqi
αβqh
i +α(1−β)qhqi
ψh
i =
αβql
i+α(1−β)qlqi
(1−α)qi+αβqh
i +α(1−β)qhqi
, i ∈ {A,B}.
As the As on average are richer than the Bs, the As put less weight on υl (t) than the Bs
among both the rich and the poor. Furthermore, the poor As put more weight on this term
than the rich Bs if
(1 − α)qA + αβql
A + α(1 − β)qlqA
αβqh
A + α(1 − β)qhqA
>
αβql
B + α(1 − β)qlqB
(1 − α)qB + αβqh
B + α(1 − β)qhqB
,
which holds if
(1 − α) − αβ

ql
B
qB
−
ql
A
qA

> 0. (10)
This is the case if agents have a low degree of social conscience, a weak group-commitment, and
the As are not much richer than the Bs. If (10) holds, we have what I labelled a class society
above. If (10) does not hold, we have what I referred to as a group society since voting behaviour
is determined by group membership.
A rise in β makes the As prefer a lower tax rate and the Bs a higher one as ψ
j
A is decreasing
and ψ
j
B increasing in β for j ∈ {h,l}. Hence if the decisive voter belongs to group A, increased
group antagonism will imply lower tax rates whereas a decisive voter from group B will give
increased taxes. When qh
A > 1/2 or ql
B > 1/2 the high-income As or the low income Bs have
the pivotal voter in all cases. This situation is relatively uninteresting, so I will disregard it. At
β = 0, the two groups have identical tax preferences within each income group and (10) does
not hold. A marginal rise in β makes the As prefer a lower rate than the Bs; in this case the
poor As are the pivotal agents if ql > 1/2, the rich Bs otherwise. The result is a reduced tax
rate if the As are pivotal and a decline if the Bs are. However, at some stage, we may reach the
level where (10) holds. Then the pivotal agent changes to the other group.
Consider now a slightly more complicated income distribution where there are N income
levels in increasing order. Let q
j
i denote the fraction of society belonging to group i ∈ {A,B}
and having income level j ∈ {1,...,N}. The fraction of As is qA =
PN
j=1 q
j
A and qB = 1 − qB.
The As are richer than the Bs in the sense that
1
qA
n X
j=1
q
j
A <
1
qB
n X
j=1
q
j
B
8for all n < N (the distribution for the As ﬁrst order stochastically dominates that for the Bs).
When β = 0, there are two median voters with identical (median) income level Jm determined
by
Jm X
j=1
q
j
A + q
j
B ≥ 1/2 and
Jm−1 X
j=1
q
j
A + q
j
B < 1/2.
When β rises, the A-agent wants a lower tax rate and the B-agent a higher. If qJm
B +
PJm−1
j=1

q
j
A + q
j
B

<
1/2, the A-agent is decisive for small β. Then the tax rate declines if β increases. Assume this
is the case. Then at some level of β, the A-median voter, whose income level is Jm, reaches the
tax preference of the B-agent in income level Jm+1, the income level just above the A-agent. A
continued rise in β will lead this B-agent to become decisive for some time. Then she is caught
up by the A-agent with income level Jm − 1 and so on.
To study how tax preferences change when β rises, notice that the weighting function for an
agent with income x belonging to group i may be written
(1 − α)Dx + αβFi + α(1 − β)F (11)
= (1 − α)Dx + α(β + (1 − β)qi)Fi + α(1 − β)q−iF−i
where F−i and q−i is the distribution function and size of the other group. Here it is seen that
the eﬀect of a change in β on the weighting function is greater the smaller qi is. If qi is close
to unity, then F already give group i a large weight, and a change in β has less eﬀect than if
group i has a smaller weight in F. Hence the smaller a group is, the larger are the changes in
tax preferences within the group.
The eﬀect of a rise in β is determined by two factors: First, if tax preferences change a lot
within each group, this decreases their power in the political struggle as their median voter is
quickly swapped with a new median voter that to a large extent accommodates the preferences
of the other group. Second, the size of each income level in each group determines the number
of voters and hence increases political inﬂuence. This factor may be divided into two secondary
factors, the size of the groups qA and qB and the relative size of each income level within the
group given by q
j
i/qi. Hence there are a total of three factors to take into account. However, if
we have an inﬁnite number of income groups, i.e. a continuous income distribution, I will show
below that the eﬀect of group size exactly oﬀsets the eﬀect of changes in preferences. Then what
matters is the relative size of each income level within the group. If this is high close to the
median income of society, the group is inﬂuential.
3.2 Continuous income distributions
Although the analysis becomes somewhat more involved, the case of continuous income distribu-
tions is more realistic and also provides additional insights. Call the marginal density functions
associated to FA and FB fA and fB. Assume that there are no holes or mass points so that
0 < fi (x) < ∞ for all i ∈ {A,B} and x ∈ Ω; deviations from this assumption are discussed in
Appendix A. Diﬀerentiation of the system (9) with regard to β yields
SA
ttdt + (1 − α)
∂St
 
t,Dxm
A

∂xm
A
dxm
A + αSt (t,FA − F)dβ = 0 (12a)
SB
ttdt + (1 − α)
∂St
 
t,Dxm
B

∂xm
B
dxm
B + αSt (t,FB − F)dβ = 0 (12b)
qfA (xm
A)dxm
A + (1 − q)fB (xm
B)dxm
B = 0 (12c)
where
Si
tt = Stt

t,(1 − α)Dxm
i + αβFi + α(1 − β)F

< 0, i ∈ {A,B}.
9Deﬁne
ˆ wA =
sAqfA(xm
A)
sAqfA(xm
A)+sB(1−q)fB(xm
B)
ˆ wB =
sB(1−q)fB(xm
B)
sAqfA(xm
A)+sB(1−q)fB(xm
B)
and
sA = −

∂2u((1−t)xm
A+T(t)¯ x)
∂x∂t
−1
sB = −

∂2u((1−t)xm
B+T(t)¯ x)
∂x∂t
−1 (13)
Then the implicit function theorem yields
dt
dβ
= −αq (1 − q)
sAfA (xm
A) − sBfB (xm
B)
ˆ wASA
tt + ˆ wBSB
tt
St (t,FA − FB). (14)
From this expression, we see that the tax rate is decreasing in β if sAfA (xm
A) > sBfB (xm
B)
maintaining the assumption that the As are the richer. Consider ﬁrst the case where β = 0, so
that sA = sB. Then the incomes of the median voter from the two groups are both the median
income in society xm and
dt
dβ
∝ [fA (xm) − fB (xm)]St (t,FA − FB). (15)
This expression is negative if the density of the distribution within group A is higher than
that within group B at the median of income distribution, as was discussed at the end of last
section. When β rises marginally from β = 0, the A-median voter care less about group B, and
consequently prefer a lower tax rate whereas the B-median voter now cares less about group A
and therefore prefers a higher tax rate. Consequently, as β increases, the median voters will be
an A-agent with endowment xm
A < xm and a B-agent with endowment xm
B > xm. Notice that
this change is preferences is very similar to the one discussed by Persson and Tabellini (1994:
168f). If fA (xm) is small, |xm
A − xm| will be large relative to |xm
B − xm|, so the A-median voter
will be poor relative to the former median voter. Although she has a tendency to prefer low tax
rates since τ (FA) < τ (F), this tendency is weakened by her wish to have high transfers because
she is poor. To summarize, we have the following ﬁrst main result:
Proposition 1 When group A is richer than group B in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance, then a rise in the degree of group antagonism β decreases the politically chosen tax
rate if sAfA (xm
A) > sBfB (xm
B) where xm
i are the incomes of the median voters and si is given
by (13). At the initial point β = 0 this condition simpliﬁes to fA (xm) > fB (xm).
To graphically illustrate the eﬀects of fractionalization, consider the function
Z (t,F) = 1 − F (x) where St (t,(1 − α)Dx + αF) = 0, (16)
which gives the fraction of the population that prefers a tax rate below t in the non-fractionalized
case. We have similar functions for group A and B in the fractionalized case; their densities are
illustrated in Figure 1. The chosen tax rate in the non-fractionalized case t0, is determined as
Z (t0,F) = 1/2. In the fractionalized case, the tax rate is determined by the equation
qZ (t,FA) + (1 − q)Z (t,FB) = 1/2.
The initial median voter from group A prefers the tax rate tA < t0 in the fractionalized case.
Hence a mass Z (t0,FA)−Z (tA,FA) of A-voters change from being in favour of a tax rate above
t0 to a tax rate below t0. This mass corresponds to the area A. Similarly, a mass of B-voters
corresponding to the area B used to be in favour of a tax rate below t0, but now prefers a tax
rate above. Hence the chosen tax rate will decrease if qA > (1 − q)B. This is the case if (14)
is negative. As mentioned above, the sign does not depend on q; since F = qFA + (1 − q)FB,
the functions Z (t,FA) and Z (t,F) will be close when q is large. This eﬀect perfectly oﬀsets the
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Figure 1: Effect of an increase in group antagonism β  eﬀect of group A being numerically important. We may say that the impact of q is already taken
into account in F. What is important for the eﬀect on taxation is the inﬂuence of each group
relative to the weight the social planner would put on each of them. However, the magnitude
of the eﬀect of fractionalization depends on the degree of polarization q (1 − q).
Whether fA (xm) − fB (xm) is positive or negative will depend on the shape of the income
distributions and the endowments of the median voters. At β = 0, both median voters have the
same endowment xm. However, since the As are richer than the Bs, the median voter from group
A is in a lower income fractile than the one from group B. If the shape of the distribution for the
As and the Bs are relatively similar, this implies that fA (xm) − fB (xm) is positive. Although
it is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd distributions such that fA (xm) − fB (xm) is not positive, I believe it is
at least only slightly negative in most real world cases. Obviously, this is an empirical question.
Below, I present some evidence based on US data that supports my claim.
Furthermore, except for very low incomes, both fA and fB are likely to be decreasing func-
tions. As β increases, xm
A declines and xm
B rises, which imply that fA (xm) rises and fB (xm)
declines. As we shall see below, as β increases, the requirement for a negative eﬀect on the tax
rate is lower.
The group weights sA and sB will also play a role for β > 0. These variables give the change
in the eﬀect of increased income on tax preferences, and their sign depend on the third derivative
of the utility function. The sign is somewhat unclear, although they are likely to be increasing
in income in most cases, which pulls in the opposite direction of the eﬀects described above.
However, this eﬀect is normally quite small, so I do not believe this eﬀect will dominate.
Observe that if the groups are geographically segmented, it is quite probable that redistri-
bution takes place locally so most of the tax levied from one agent is transferred to her fellow
group members. This may to some extent limit the consequences of high fractionalization but
excludes possibly beneﬁcial redistribution between groups. An extension of the model in this
direction, which is closely related to the literature on the optimal size of nations (Alesina and
Spolaore 1997, Goyal and Staal 2003), is outside the scope of the present paper.
We see from equation (14) that the magnitude of the term depends on q (1 − q), the Herﬁnd-
ahl measure of fractionalization. This easily extends to the case of multiple groups. Hence we
have the following result:
Proposition 2 When the conditions for Proposition 1 holds, then conditional on the group
income distributions and the degree of group antagonism, increased fractionalization leads to
less support for redistribution.
This Proposition extend Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly’s (1999) and Miguel and Gugerty’s
(2003) results on public good provision to redistribution.
3.3 Some evidence on the density at the median
It was seen above that the eﬀect of fractionalization and group antagonism, given by equations
(14) and (15), depends crucially on the diﬀerence between the densities at the median for the
groups. I argued that the density would be higher for the richest group. To study the realism of
the assumption, I performed some calculations on US income distributions using data from the
US Census Bureau (2001: Table A-1). Figure 2 shows estimated income distributions for Blacks
and Whites for 20019. The eﬀect of increased fractionalization when β = 0 (no fractionalization)
will depend on the diﬀerence at the mean income of the entire population, which is seen to be
higher for Whites than for Blacks. As β increases, the relevant densities are to the left of the
9Data on income fractiles for Blacks and Whites are taken from US Census Bureau (2001: Table A-1). The
cumulative density function of the income distribution is then approximated by a cubic spline and densities are
found by diﬀerentiation. Micro data for 2000 from the LIS give almost identical results.
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Figure 2: Estimated income distributions for Blacks and Whites, USA 2001. 
Continuous line is for Blacks, dashed line for Whites. The vertical line is the overall median income.  median for the Whites and to the right of the median for the Black, reenforcing the eﬀect. I
have performed similar calculations for the years 1967 to 2001. A summary of the results are
presented in Appendix B. The ﬁnding is that for all these years, the density for Whites is higher
than that for Blacks. Hence for the US, the models quite clearly predicts that a rise in the
degree of fractionalization should lower the support for redistribution.
4 Fractionalization and total welfare
4.1 The simple case
The eﬀects of fractionalization on taxes is interesting in itself. However, it is also interesting to
study how fractionalization aﬀects social welfare through the choice of public policy. Consider
ﬁrst the simple case with only two income levels studied in Section 3.1. A benevolent social
planner would put weight ψ∗ = ql/qh on the low-income group and weight unity on the high-
income group. The ineﬃciency of the election-decided tax rate stems in the class society from
the poor unduly neglecting the welfare of the rich and vice versa. In the group society, it stems
from each group neglecting the welfare of the other. The magnitude of the ineﬃciency aﬄicted
by the median voter, who puts weight ψ on the low-income group, depends on the magnitude
of |ψ/ψ∗ − 1|. For all parameter values, ψl
B > ψ∗ and ψh
A < ψ∗. Since ψl
B is decreasing and ψh
A
increasing in β, increased fractionalization is always detrimental for total welfare if the median
voter belongs to one of these groups. In the other cases, things are a bit more complex. We
have
ψl
A > ψ∗ ⇔ (1 − α)
qA
ql − αβ

qh
A
qh −
ql
A
ql

> 0 (17)
ψh
B < ψ∗ ⇔ (1 − α)
qB
qh − αβ

ql
B
ql −
qh
B
qh

= (1 − α)
qB
qh − αβ

qh
A
qh −
ql
A
ql

> 0. (18)
If (17) holds, the poor As put too much weight on the poor relative to the social optimum.
An increase in the degree of fractionalization (increased β) will make the median voters care
more about the As than the Bs as ψl
A is decreasing in β. Since there are more rich As then
Bs, this implies that they put less emphasis on the poor, and hence approaches the optimal
weights. This is illustrated in Figure 3, where it is seen that maximization of a weighted average
of the median voter’s private utility and the welfare of group A leads to a better outcome than
maximization of a weighted average of the private utility and social welfare even though the
objective is maximization of social welfare. A similar argument may be made for the rich Bs.
What is striking in expressions (17) and (18) is that unless voters are pure altruists, these
conditions will always be fulﬁlled for β = 0. This means that unless the median voter belongs to
one of the extreme groups, some fractionalization is always good. However, the higher is β, the
more likely it is that (17) and (18) don’t hold any more, so a very high degree of fractionalization
is often not ideal neither. Also, as we shall see below, this result is an artefact of this particular
economic structure and does not necessarily hold in the more general case. However, the lower is
the degree of social conscience, the higher is the bias of the median voter’s preferences towards
her own needs, and the more useful is fractionalization to pull her preferences in the right
direction.
4.2 The general case
Let us now consider the case of a general income distribution studied in Section 3.2. In the
intermediary fractionalized case, the ﬁrst order condition for a median voter from group A is
St
 
t,(1 − α)Dxm
A + αβFA + α(1 − β)F

= 0 =: St (t,F) + Ψ(t) (19)
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Figure 3: The effect of fractionalization on social welfare where
Ψ(t) = (1 − α)St
 
t,Dxm
A − F

+ αβ (1 − q)St (t,FA − FB), (20)
and of course a similar expression holds for a median voter from group B. The ﬁrst term of Ψ
is the eﬀect of the median voter caring more about herself than other individuals in society and
the last term stems from the median voter caring more for group A than group B. It is clear
that the absolute value of the second term is increasing in β. It is seen that for α = 1, the ﬁrst
term disappears and it follows that fractionalization is necessarily bad. For α = 0, on the other
hand, fractionalization does not matter.
Diﬀerentiation of (20) with regard to β yields
∂Ψ(t)
∂β
= (1 − α)
∂St
 
t,Dxm
A

∂xm
A
dxm
A
dβ
+ α(1 − q)St (t,FA − FB). (21)
Inserting (15) into (12a), we get at β = 0
dxm
A
dβ
=
α
1 − α
 
∂St
 
t,Dxm
A

∂xm
A
!−1
St [t,(wA − 1)FA + wBFB], (22)
where I have assumed that fA and fB exist and are strictly positive in a neighbourhood of xm.
Hence, at β = 0 we have
∂Ψ(t)
∂β
= αq (1 − q)
fA (xm) − fB (xm)
qfA (xm) + (1 − q)fB (xm)
St [t,FA − FB]. (23)
It is also seen that at the chosen tax rate,
∂Ψ(t)
∂β
= −Stt
∂t
∂β
.
Following the discussion above, we should expect Ψ(t) to be decreasing in β in most reasonable
cases. If St (t,Dxm − F) > 0, i.e. the original median voter privately prefers a tax rate above the
social optimum, then at least some fractionalization enhances the economic eﬃciency by lowering
the tax rate. If the median voter prefers a tax rate that is too low, then fractionalization is
detrimental to eﬃciency.
Consider the case of an A-voter; the case is symmetric for a B-voter. In most cases, the
median voter privately prefers a higher tax rate than the social optimum, which corresponds to
the ﬁrst term in (20). However, the As are richer than the Bs, so if there is fractionalization,
an A-median voter will care about the tax-averse As rather than the whole of the population.
This may then act as a counter-weight to the median voter’s preferences for a tax rate above
the social optimum. This is illustrated in Figure 3. However, the median voter may also prefer
a tax rate below the social optimum. In that case, the second term in (20) tends to increase
this bias. A rise in β has two eﬀects. The A-median voter becomes poorer, and hence privately
prefers a higher tax rate. At the same time, she puts more weight on the As and less on the Bs.
This eﬀect tends to reduce her preferences for high tax rates. It is impossible to say which eﬀect
dominates in the general case. Since the median voter could have preferences both above and
below the social optimum, it is clear that there are both cases where increased group antagonism
increases eﬃciency and reduces it.
5 Income distribution and the size of government
We can use the results obtained above to study the eﬀects of increased inequality in fractionalized
societies. Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of increased intra-group inequality. Consider the completely
13fractionalized case given by the system (7). An increase in inequality may be studied as a mean
preserving spread which is equivalent to second order stochastic dominance.. If the income
distribution of group i changes from F0
i to F1
i , inequality has increased if F0
i second order
stochastically dominates F1
i . It is easy to show that under general conditions, this implies that
the median voter of group i now prefers a higher tax rate.10 Consequently, if inequality increases
in one or both groups, the size of government increases. It is easily seen that if inequality
increases in one group, it also increases in society as a whole. Consequently, the median voter in
group i also prefers a higher tax rate in the partially fractionalized (and non-fractionalized) case.
These results are very similar to those found in the ordinary Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard
model.
An increase in inter-group inequality is more interesting. Assume that initially, both groups
have the same income distribution F. An increase in inter-group inequality is a situation where
the groups A and B get the income distributions FA and FB where FA ﬁrst order stochastically
dominates FB. For analytical simplicity, I will concentrate on a continuous transition between
the two states where group i ∈ {A,B} has the income distribution ˜ Fγi := γFi + (1 − γ)F
with marginal densities ˜ fγi, which are assumed to take ﬁnite and strictly positive values for all
incomes in Ω. Then we keep the economy-wide income distribution F ﬁxed, but increase the
diﬀerence between the groups. γ = 0 corresponds to the initial state and γ = 1 to the ﬁnal
state. When we limit our attention to the completely fractionalized case, the politically chosen
tax rate t satisﬁes the following system, similar to the equations studied in Section 3.2:
St
 
t,(1 − α)Dxm
A + γαFA + (1 − γ)αF

= 0 (24a)
St
 
t,(1 − α)Dxm
B + γαFB + (1 − γ)αF

= 0 (24b)
q ˜ FγA (xm
A) + (1 − q) ˜ FγB (xm
B) =
1
2
. (24c)
As γ enters (24c), analysis of this system is slightly more involved than of (9) However, I will
show that the results are almost identical. The implicit function theorem yields
dt
dγ
= Ξ
(
(1 − α)Γ
sAq ˜ fγA
 
xm
A

+ sB (1 − q) ˜ fγB
 
xm
B
 (25)
+αq (1 − q)
h
sA ˜ fγA (xm
A) − sB ˜ fγB (xm
B)
i
St (FA − FB)
o
.
where
Ξ = −
sAq ˜ fγA (xm
A) + sB (1 − q) ˜ fγB (xm
B)
sAq ˜ fγA
 
xm
A

SA
tt + sB (1 − q) ˜ fγB
 
xm
B

SB
tt
> 0, (26)
Γ = q (FA − F)(xm
A) + (1 − q)(FB − F)(xm
B), (27)
and si is given by (13). The traditional Romer-Richard-Meltzer-Richard model is obtained by
letting α = 0. Then the eﬀect on the size of government of an inter-group rise in inequality is
given by the sign of Γ, which corresponds to the eﬀect of the change in the median endowment
of the society when intra-group inequality rises.
When group A is richer than B in the sense that FA ﬁrst order stochastically dominates
FB, it follows that St [t,FA] < St [t,FB]. Furthermore, as I argued above, it is probable that
fA (xm
A) > fB (xm
B). If the overall income distribution is single-peaked and skewed to the right,
then f (xm
A) > f (xm
B) and hence ˜ fA (xm
A) > ˜ fB (xm
B). Then the square brackets in the second
term in (25) is positive, so the second term is negative.
10A suﬃcient condition is that
∂
∂tu[(1 − t)x + T (t) ¯ x] is decreasing and concave in x for all x, a result that is
well-known from the theory of choice under uncertainty.
14Hence if we can show that Γ ≤ 0, we would have established that dt/dγ < 0. The sign of
Γ is, however, a bit involved. It is negative if the proportion of the As that has incomes in the
interval [xm
A,xm
B] is larger than the corresponding proportion of the Bs as we may write
Γ = q (1 − q){[FA (xm
A) − FA (xm
B)] − [FB (xm
A) − FB (xm
B)]}.
At γ = 0, we have Γ = 0 and
∂Γ
∂γ

 

γ=0
= q (1 − q)(fA − fB)(xm)
 
∂xm
A
∂γ

 

γ=0
−
∂xm
B
∂γ

 

γ=0
!
,
which is negative when (fA − fB)(xm) > 0, the usual higher density at the median-condition.
Hence for small values of γ, Γ ≤ 0. Furthermore, diﬀerentiation of (24c) and rearranging yields
γ
∂Γ
∂γ
= −Γ −

qfA (xm
A)
∂xm
A
∂γ
+ (1 − q)fB (xm
B)
∂xm
B
∂γ

.
The ﬁrst term is equilibrating and tends to keep Γ close to zero. Inserting from (24a) and (24b),
the term in square brackets may be rewritten
−1
1 − α

qsAfASA
tt + (1 − q)sBfBSB
tt
 dt
dγ
−
α
1 − α
q (1 − q)(sAfA − sBfB)St (t,FA − FB).
Here, the ﬁrst term will also be equilibrating as we only can have dt/dγ > 0 if Γ > 0, and
the second term negative as long as sAfA > sBfB. When this is true, dΓ/dγ < 0 as Γ ≤ 0
in a neighbourhood of γ = 0 and dΓ/dγ < 0 for all Γ > 0. Consequently, both terms in curly
brackets (25) are negative, so dt/dγ < 0.
This means that because the society is fractionalized, there is a tendency towards reduced
tax rates when the inter-group inequality rises. If the rate of social conscience is not too low,
we can expect a rise in inter-group inequality to reduce the size of government, also if there is
a rise in inter-group inequality at the same time. Hence we have the following result:
Proposition 3 When group A is richer than group B in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance, a mean preserving between group spread in the income distribution decreases the
politically chosen tax rate if sAfA > sBfB, i.e. when the conditions for group antagonism
decreasing the tax rate outlined in Proposition 1 holds.
6 Fractionalization and the party system
Although I alluded to a Downsian party system above, political parties were not discussed
properly. For the machinery above to work, we either need the tax rate to be the only political
issue or to be decided on independently of all other issues. However, this is highly unrealistic.
In heavily fractionalized countries, ethnic parties seem to ﬂourish. This indicates that other
issue dimensions are important. Since there will usually be a number of other policy issues
than the tax levels to which diﬀerent ethnic groups have diﬀerent opinions, this observation
is unsurprising. To accommodate this, Collier (2001) considers a model where members of
one ethnic group always votes for her own group’s party, and where the party programs are
determined within the ethnic group.
Without going into detail, I will present an extension of the model above where voters have
preferences for what I will label the ethnicity of the chosen policy in addition to tax rates.
15Ethnicity may include a range of choices regarding linguistic, religious, and moral questions as
well as protection of minorities, and is assumed to be an element of some metric space. Let us
now assume that a voter from group i with endowment x has a utility function
Vi (t,E;x) = Ui (x,t) − φd(E,Ei) (28)
where d is a metric on the space of ethnic policies, E is the chosen policy, Ei is the ethnic policy
preferred by group i, and Ui is the utility function deﬁned in (6). The parameter φ indicates how
important ethnicity-related issues are to voters. The model in Section 2 corresponds to φ = 0,
that is, a case where there are no diﬀerences between diﬀerent ethnic policies that matters to
voters. Collier’s (2001) analysis corresponds to φ → ∞, where a voter could never vote for a
party advocating the policies of other groups than her own. Some indiﬀerence curves for this
utility function are shown in Figure 4, where for purposes of visualization, the space of ethnic
policies is assumed to correspond to the real line. The curves are for an A-voter with preferred
tax rate t∗. She will prefer to vote for a party of her own ethnicity as long as it advocates a tax
rate in the interval
 
t,t

. If there are no parties of her own ethnicity within this interval, she
may consider voting for a party of the other ethnicity. The higher is φ, the larger is the height
of an indiﬀerence curve relative to its width. In the limiting case of φ → ∞, the interval
 
t,t

would cover the real line whereas it would collapse to a single point as φ → 0.
If we allow for sequential voting, the eﬀect of voting over E will vanish independently of
the voting order and the results obtained in previous sections persist. However, if we introduce
simultaneous voting or a parliamentary system, this is generally no longer true. The utility
function (28) implies preferences over two non-parallel political issues. Hence we can no longer
use the median voter theorem, and in the general case, political equilibria will be unstable. The
case of φ = 0 is the one we have already studied. In the case of φ → ∞, we can imagine a
four party system with two parties belonging to each group. All voters belonging to group i will
consider parties from the other group as worse than any i-party and hence the two i-parties will
share the i-voters among themselves. It is then natural to use the median voter in each of the
two groups, so the two i-parties will end up with the same program for a tax rate corresponding
to the preferred tax rate of the median voter within group i. Since both i-parties have equal
platforms, it is highly probable that they will form a governing coalition if their group is the
larger. Regrettably, it follows that if there are more than two groups, parliamentary decision
making is more complicated and less predictable. In the two-group case, the tax rate may be
said to be determined by the preferences of the median voter of the largest group. Assume that
group A is the largest group and xm
A is the median income in group A. Then the chosen tax rate
in the case of partially fractionalized social conscience is τ
 
(1 − α)Dxm
A + αβFA + α(1 − β)F

.
We see that most of the results of an increase in β obtained in Section 3 still hold. However,
since group A is the sole decisive group, the value of β does not inﬂuence the endowment of
the pivotal voter, so the analysis is somewhat simpler. If group A is the richest group, then
an increase in β will reduce the tax rate since all A-voters put more emphasis on the welfare
of group A which advocates a lower tax rate than group B. If the median voter’s privately
preferred tax rate is above the social optimum, then an increase in β is eﬃciency enhancing,
otherwise it is not. This will depend on how large the income diﬀerence between group A and
B are and how skewed the distributions are. Unfortunately, for the case of φ ∈ (0,∞) there is
no simple solution to the outcome of simultaneous voting. However, it is very likely that the
outcome is somewhere between the two extreme cases.
If we look at stable democracies, it seems that most two-party systems, particularly the UK
and the US, ﬁt my initial model relatively well. This is also true for the Scandinavian countries
although one may argue that there is a rural-urban/religious issue that perturbs the system
somewhat. In the latter case, however, the reason may be that the degree of fractionalization is
limited and the diﬀerence between diﬀerent groups is small. Some of the continental European
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Figure 4: Preferences over tax rates and ethnic policies countries, on the other hand, cannot be understood without taking group-speciﬁc policies into
consideration. In some of these countries, the groups have almost their own societies within the
society, with of course their own political parties. This may seem to ﬁt well to Colliers model.
However, the result is generally not that the largest group can dictate the others. Rather,
decision making is consensus based and minorities have constitutional protections.
7 Testing the model
7.1 The data
In this section I report results from some simple estimations to study the validity of some of the
model’s main predictions. It would be interesting to study the eﬀect of group antagonism β on
support for redistribution. However, at the time being I don’t know any method to measure β,
so I will limit the test to the following somewhat simpler predictions:
1. For a given level of group antagonism, a higher degree of fractionalization leads to less
redistribution (Proposition 2)
2. Within group inequality should increase the support for redistribution (Proposition 3)
3. Between group inequality should reduce the support for redistribution (Proposition 3)
To perform the tests, I employ a panel of US states with six observations per state.11 The
main reason for using a single country is that the deﬁnition of groups and the collection of data on
groups are more homogeneous. We need measures of inequality both between and within groups.
As such data are not readily available, I had to construct the measures from micro data. Income
data are taken from March Current Population Survey, made available through the Luxembourg
Income Study (LIS).12 For purposes of politically determined tax rates, the relevant measure
of income is pre-tax factor income. Household incomes are normalized according to the square
root equivalence scale. As we want to decompose inequality into within- and between-group
inequality, it is desirable to use a decomposable inequality measure. Requiring the transfer
principle and independence of scale to hold, we are left with the class of generalized entropy
measures
Iκ
GE =
1
κ(κ − 1)
Z 
x
µ
κ
− 1

dF (x),
where F is the CDF of the income distribution, µ the mean income, and κ a parameter (Bour-
guignon 1979; Shorrocks 1981). The higher is κ, the more weight the measure puts on inequality
in the upper range of the income distribution. I concentrate on κ = 0, which should capture the
inequality close to the median reasonably well, but I also consider κ’s from −1 to 2.
I use two measures of redistribution. The ﬁrst is the average share of transfers received by
households as a share of disposable income, calculated from the LIS data. This also includes
federal transfers, but this should not be an obstacle for the relevant tests. The second measure is
state expenditure on public welfare as a share of state personal income. Data on public welfare
is taken from Government ﬁnances (US Department of Commerce, various years) whereas state
personal income is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.13
To measure group fractionalization, I use the conventional Herﬁndahl measure which gives
the probability that two randomly selected persons belong to diﬀerent groups. The groups are
11The states are observed in 1969, 1974, 1986, 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2000. Although 1979 is also available from
the LIS, these data lack information about state of residence, rendering them useless. Furthermore, I do not have
data on average share of transfers to disposable income for 1969.
12See http://www.lisproject.org for details.
13Available at http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/spi/
17African American, white, and other in 1969, African American, Spanish, white, and other in
1974 and 1986, and African American, American Indian/Aleut/Eskimo, Asian/Paciﬁc Islander,
Hispanic white, non-hispanic white, and other thereafter. The fractionalization index is calcu-
lated from the LIS data used for calculating the between-group inequality measure. This is to
avoid the inequality measure picking up elements of the fractionalization measure. Comparing
my fractionalization values with values obtained from the 1990 census, I get an overall correla-
tion of .87, ranging from .67 in 1969 to .98 in the 1990s. This indicates that my measure should
be appropriate. Data on the fraction of the population above 65 is also derived from the LIS
data.
Table 1 gives basic descriptive statistics of the data and Figures 5 to 8 show the geographical
distribution of fractionalization, within- and between group inequality, and average transfers as
a share of disposable income. For the ﬁgures, all numbers are measured in 2000. We notice
that the degree of fractionalization follow quite similar patterns with high values in the South
and South-West. Within group inequality is uncorrelated with between group inequality (the
correlation coeﬃcient is -.05) and does not seem to follow any strong geographical patterns.
Finally, transfers are generally high in the Midwest and the North East.
7.2 Empirical results
Table 2 shows the main empirical results. In column (1) to (7) the dependent variable is the
average share of transfers in household disposable income. The ﬁrst thing we notice is that
overall factor income inequality seems to induce higher transfers, as predicted by the Romer-
Roberts-Meltzer-Richard model. A one standard deviation increase in inequality increases the
fraction of transfers by .016 or about half a standard deviation, which should be judged a
quite large eﬀect. This result is also strongly signiﬁcant in the ﬁxed eﬀects panel data model
reported in column (2). Fractionalization seems to have a negative eﬀect on transfers. A one
standard deviation increase in fractionalization reduces transfers by about 0.005 or about 0.15
of a standard deviation. Hence the magnitude of this eﬀect is far smaller. This eﬀect does not
seem to be robust to the introduction of state ﬁxed eﬀects. As fractionalization changes little
over time, this is not surprising. Furthermore, the positive coeﬃcient on fractionalization in
column (2) is mainly due to a few outliers, most importantly Idaho 1974. Non-reported robust
regressions also conﬁrm this.
According to the results discussed in Section 5, within group inequality should increase
redistribution whereas between group inequality should reduce it. In column (3) I split inequality
into within and between inequality. We see that the estimates conform to the expectations from
the theoretical model, although the coeﬃcient on between group inequality is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero. However, the two parameters are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other at
the 5% level of conﬁdence. We also notice that the coeﬃcient on within group inequality when
we control for between group inequality is numerically larger than the coeﬃcient on overall
inequality. Hence aggregating between and within inequality tends to hide some of the eﬀect of
within group inequality on redistribution. Introducing state ﬁxed eﬀects give almost identical
results.
One may worry that the results are driven by a few outliers. To check this, I rerun some
of the results using median regressions instead of least squares, reported in columns (5) to (7).
The changes in the estimates are not dramatic, and the overall conclusions persist. As a ﬁxed
eﬀects estimator for median regression has not yet been developed, I introduce eight Division
dummies to partially pick up state ﬁxed eﬀects. Now, between group inequality gets a positive
eﬀect on transfers, but still smaller than within inequality. However, the diﬀerence is no longer
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
The measure of transfers also contains federal transfers, so it may be argued that it is too
18Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable    Obs  Periods  States  Mean  Std. dev.  Between std. 
dev. 
Within std. dev 
Total inequality  κ =-1  357              7 51 31.72 33.20 8.73 32.05
  κ=0  357             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
               
7 51 .570 .134 .047 .125
  κ=1  357 7 51 .353 .076 .029 .070
  κ=2  357 7 51 .290 .103 .039 .096
Between group inequality  κ=-1  357 7 51 .077 .547 .202 .509
  κ=0  357 7 51 .015 .026 .013 .023
  κ=1  357 7 51 .012 .015 .010 .011
  κ=2  357 7 51 .007 .009 .007 .006
Within group inequality  κ=-1  357 7 51 31.64 33.22 8.77 32.06
  κ=0  357 7 51 .555 .133 .049 .123
  κ=1  357 7 51 .341 .073 .027 .068
  κ=2  357 7 51 .282 .101 .037 .094
Racial  fractionalization 357 7 51 .250 .162 .147 .072
Fraction of population above 65  357  7  51  .094  .027  .018  .020 
Log per capita income  357  7  51  9.51  .752  .148  .738 
Average share of transfers to disp. income  306  6  51  .146  .033  .023  .023 
Fraction expenditure on welfare  357  7  51  .024  .010  .007  .008 
 
Inequality is measured by the generalized entropy measure with coefficient κ . Between standard deviations are standard deviations of the state 
averages and within the average within state standard deviation.Above .47  (12)
.32 to .47  (13)
.20 to .32  (13)
Below .20  (13)
 
Figure 5: Fractionalization in 2000, by state 
Above .69   (12)
.64 to .69  (13)
.60 to .64  (13)
Below .60  (13)
 
Figure 6: Within group inequality 2000, by state. Generalized entropy measure with parameter 0. Above .019   (12)
.012  to .019  (13)
.0067 to .012  (13)
Below .0067   (13)
 
Figure 7: Between group inequality 2000, by state. Generalized entropy measure with parameter 0. 
Above .17   (11)
.15 to .17  (13)
.13 to .15  (14)
Below .13  (13)
 
Figure 8: Average transfers received as share of household disposable income 2000, by state 
 Table 2: Inequality and redistribution 
Dependent 
variable  Average fraction of transfers in disposable income  Fraction expenditure on welfare in per capita personal income 
  (1)            (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)    (8)            (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
0.675
*** 0.719
***               
                           
         
                     
         
                         
     
                   
         
                
             
                
             
                           
     
0.656
*** 0.698
*** 0.619
*** 0.574
*** 0.635
*** -0.032
* -0.022 -0.033 -0.012 -0.026 -0.040
** -0.029 Fraction above 
65  (0.045) (0.060) (0.046) (0.059) (0.045) (0.046) (0.032) (0.019) (0.015) (0.020)
 
(0.015) (0.021) (0.017) (0.022)
-0.064
*** -0.063
*** 
 
-0.065
*** -0.060
*** -0.057
*** -0.058
*** -0.075
*** 0.005
** -0.019 0.005
* -0.020
*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.019
*** 
 
Log per capita 
income  (0.006) (0.023) (0.006) (0.023)
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003)
 
(0.006) (0.003)
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
-0.028
*** 0.017
*** -0.020
*** 0.028 -0.032
*** -0.027
*** -0.034
*** -0.004 -0.017
** -0.004 -0.019
*** -0.005 -0.003 -0.002 Fractionalization 
(0.006) (0.026) (0.007)
  
(0.026)
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
  
(0.005)
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
0.121
*** 0.104
*** 0.130
*** 0.018
*** 0.006
** 0.018
*** Total inequality 
(0.012)  (0.013) (0.012)
 
(0.005)  (0.003) (0.005)
   0.128
*** 0.112
*** 0.148
*** 0.105
*** 0.018
*** 0.003 0.022
*** 0.006 Within group 
inequality  (0.012)  (0.013) (0.012)  (0.008) (0.005)  (0.003) (0.004)  (0.006)
  -0.039  -0.140 -0.018  0.063
*** 0.018  0.030
*** 0.002 0.016 Between group 
inequality  (0.074)  (0.085) (0.075)  (0.049) (0.017)  (0.011) (0.010)  (0.013)
0.666
*** 0.649
*** 0.669
*** 0.618 0.589
*** 0.593
*** 0.806
*** -0.033 0.227
** -0.033 0.241
*** 0.041 0.044
* 0.220
***  Intercept 
(0.065) (0.236)
 
(0.065) (0.232) (0.066)
 
(0.065) (0.059) (0.028)
  
(0.059)
 
(0.029) (0.059) (0.032)
  
(0.023) (0.042)
Different   -2.190
** -2.900
*** -2.150
** -0.830 -0.010  2.330
** -1.800
* 0.740
                  
                
                             
                             
                       
                         
                           
[0.029]  [0.004] [0.032]  [0.410] [0.994]  [0.020] [0.073]  [0.462]
R
2  0.762 0.716 0.766 0.719 0.538 0.576 0.576 0.425 0.275 0.425 0.266 0.295 0.297 0.400
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 357
 
357 357 357 357 357 357
Ind.  effects States States Divisions
 
States States Divisions
  Year  dummies
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimator LS LS LS LS Med Med Med LS LS LS LS Med Med Med
 
All inequalities refer to the generalized entropy measure with parameter 0. Estimator is either least squares (LS) or least absolute deviations (Med). 
Different is the t-test of the parameters on between and within group inequality being different. R
2 is overall R
2 for fixed effects models and pseudo-R
2 
for median regressions. Omitted categories are 2000 for year-dummies and East North Central for division-dummies. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95%(**), and 99% (***) confidence. p-values in square brackets.  broad. Hence I repeated the estimations using the fraction of state welfare expenditure in state
personal income as dependent variable. This measure is arguably to limited, but inequality
and fractionalization should still have the predicted eﬀects upon it. However, the results are
somewhat less appealing. Fractionalization still has a negative eﬀect on transfers, but the eﬀect
is hardly signiﬁcant in any of the speciﬁcations. However, total inequality has a positive and
strongly signiﬁcant eﬀect. A one standard deviation in inequality increases welfare expenditure
per capita by .0024 or about a quarter of a standard deviation. Although this eﬀect is smaller
than for the ﬁrst measure of transfers, the eﬀect is still important. When we distinguish between
between and within inequality, there appear to be little diﬀerence between the two. In the state
ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation, between group inequality even has a stronger positive eﬀect than
within inequality. However, is seems that this may be driven by outliers. When we use median
regression instead of least squares, the eﬀect of between group inequality is essentially zero, and
signiﬁcantly lower than the coeﬃcient on within group inequality at the 10% level.
To see whether my particular choice of inequality measure may be driving the results, I
rerun the basic regressions in columns (1) and (3) using diﬀerent values for the parameter κ.
The results are reported in Table 3. It is seen that the results are essentially the same: Inequality
has a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects on transfers, and when we decompose into between and within
group inequality, within has a somewhat stronger eﬀect whereas the eﬀect of between is about
zero. The eﬀect is less strong for κ 6= 0. However, we also see that the ﬁt of the model as
measured by R2 is highest at κ = 0, so it may seem that this is the most suitable measure of
inequality to explain redistribution.
To conclude, the ﬁrst set of regressions using the share of transfers in household disposable
income give strong support for the predictions of the model. When we turn to the fraction of
state welfare expenditure, the conclusions are weaker. However, this may to some extent be due
to the measure being to limited to capture the total picture of state redistributive eﬀorts.
8 Conclusion
Fractionalization in general, and racial divide in particular, has a major impact on politics. I have
shown that it tends to reduce the amount of redistribution in democratic polities. Furthermore,
when a society is fractionalized, inequality between and within groups have opposite eﬀects on
the support for redistribution. The former will reduce the support and the latter increase it.
These predictions also have reasonably good empirical support.
This may also be an explanation for the fact that a many very unequal societies have small
governments. The reason is twofold. In the ﬁrst place, fractionalized countries tend to have a
more uneven distribution of income than do less fractionalized cases. As fractionalization reduces
the support for redistribution, this implies a negative correlation between inequality and the size
of government. Furthermore, inter-group inequality tend to reduce the support for redistribution
in fractionalized societies. Hence if both inter- and intra-group inequality is increasing, this might
lead to less support for public redistribution. Although most of the analysis was performed
within a relatively simple model of policy determination, it seems plausible that most of the
main conclusions also hold in richer models. It also supports the view that fragmentation along
racial lines is a barrier to policies that beneﬁts the poor in racially divided countries like the
US, a view emphasized by e.g. Wilson (1978, 1999).
The theory also has implications for transition to democracy. In countries with heavy frac-
tionalization and intense groups conﬂicts, it will usually be diﬃcult to obtain democratic support
for a large welfare state. Then one has the choice between two paths towards development: On
the one hand, one could opt for a small government and little redistribution though central
budgets. On the other hand, it may be possible to go through a nation building process where
the tension between the groups is reduced and a European style welfare state becomes politically
19Table 3: Robustness to the parameter κ  
                  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
κ  -1                0 1 2 -1 0 1 2
          
          
               
            
      
      
      
            
.0001
*** 0.121
*** 0.110
***  0.020  Total inequality 
(0.000) (0.012) (0.024) (0.016)
.0001
*** 0.128
*** 0.123
*** 0.023 Within group 
inequality  (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.025)  (0.016)
-.0002  -0.039  -0.041  -0.074 Between group 
inequality  (0.002)  (0.074)  (0.098)  (0.146)
Different -0.160  -2.190
** -1.590 -0.650
        
          
                 
                 
           
           
                 
[0.869]  [0.029]  [0.113]  [0.516]
R
2 0.689 0.762 0.693 0.682 0.689 0.766 0.704 0.682
Observations 306 306 306 306 306 306 306 306
Individual effects  No  No  No No No No No No
Year effects  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Estimator LS LS LS LS LS LS LS LS
 
Dependent variable is the average fraction of transfers in disposable income. All measures of inequality are generalized entropy measures with 
parameter κ . Control variables are the fraction of the population above 65, log of per capita income, fractionalization, and year dummies. Different is 
the t-test of the parameters on between and within group inequality being different. Estimation is by ordinary least squares. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis, p-values in square brackets. Significantly different than zero at 90% (*), 95%(**), and 99% (***) confidence. feasible.
Finally, the introduction of group antagonism and income diﬀerences may help identify what
dimensions of fractionalization matter for public policy. If antagonism between members of
diﬀerent groups is high, and for the case of redistribution income diﬀerences are important,
fractionalization along this line will be important. Fractionalization along lines where group
antagonism is low will not be important for public policy. One way to measure this could be
to study the eﬀect of group belonging on support for redistribution or public policy provision,
controlling for income. If group belonging turns out to be important, this would be a sign of
the group dimension being an important dimension of fractionalization.
A Mass points and holes in the income distribution
If a cumulative distribution function G has mass points, we cannot simply deﬁne the dth fractile
as {xd : G(xd) = d} since there may be no unique xd for which this holds. For this purpose, I
will use the symbol 3. Let us deﬁne the relation 3 to mean that
G(xd) 3 d if G(xd) ≥ d and lim
x→x−
d
G(x) ≤ d. (29)
For two CDFs G1 and G2, I will also write
G1 (x1) + G2 (x2) 3 d if



G1 (x1) + G2 (x2) ≥ dlim G1 (x1) + G2 (x2) 3 d
and
limx→x−
1 G1 (x) + limx→x−
2 G2 (x) ≤ d
.
If G does not have a mass point at xd then G(xd) 3 d implies G(xd) = d. Throughout the
paper, the notation may be extended to the case of discontinuous distributions by replacing the
equality sign by 3 when deﬁning quantiles. For instance, in this notation, the tax rate preferred
by the median voter is found as the solution to the system

St (t,(1 − α)Dxm + αF) = 0
F (xm) 3 1
2
. (30)
If we have hole in the income distribution, this may have an impact of the results of the
analysis in Section 3.2. Consider the case where say FB is constant at xm, that is, fB (xm) = 0.
Then there is only one median voter belonging to group A. It is also seen that (12c) reduces to
dXm
A = 0, so (12a) simpliﬁes to
dt
dβ
=
−α
Stt (t,(1 − α)Dxm + αF)
St (t,FA − F),
that is, the change in the tax rate is strictly in the direction desired by group A. The reason
is simply that in this society, the tax rate is marginally determined by the A-group only, and
a slight change in β does not change this situation. However, a non-marginal change in β may
permit new coalitions to form and change this result. This case is in fact similar to the case of
a mass point for group i at xm, i.e. fi (xm) → ∞, that was analysed in Section 3.1.
B Detailed data on the densities at the median
The table underneath gives details of the density of the income distribution for an income equal
to the overall median income for the Blacks and Whites for the last ten years. Median incomes
are given in 2001 dollars.
20Table A1: Density at the median of the US income distribution for Blacks and Whites 
 
Year Median  Density  x100 
   income  Blacks  Whites 
2001 42228  1.03  1.05 
2000 43162  1.03  1.04 
1999 43355  0.96  1.04 
1998 42173  0.98  1.07 
1997 40699  1.05  1.11 
1996 39869  1.04  1.12 
1995 39306  1.06  1.16 
1994 38119  1.03  1.18 
1993 37688  1.06  1.20 
1992 37880  1.06  1.20 
1991 38183  1.08  1.22 
1990 39324  1.06  1.24 
1989 39850  1.04  1.18 
1988 39144  0.98  1.19 
1987 38835  1.04  1.21 
1986 38365  1.04  1.23 
1985 37059  1.12  1.28 
1984 36343  1.12  1.31 
1983 35438  1.13  1.35 
1982 35423  1.16  1.36 
1981 35478  1.11  1.34 
1980 36035  1.15  1.35 
1979 37192  1.12  1.31 
1978 37234  1.17  1.32 
1977 34989  1.23  1.39 
1976 34792  1.26  1.42 
1975 34219  1.32  1.45 
1974 35159  1.29  1.46 
1973 36278  1.24  1.41 
1972 35560  1.25  1.46 
1971 34126  1.38  1.53 
1970 34481  1.34  1.54 
1969 34714  1.39  1.57 
1968 33436  1.41  1.65 
1967 32081  1.43  1.68 
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